Lorne & Vale Get started

Paris, post-quantum

Hosted in Paris
Post-quantum where it counts

Since 5 November 2026, your workspace’s database, its files and the servers that run the platform are in Paris. Connections to them use a post-quantum key exchange on devices that support it, your documents are sealed with ML-KEM-1024 and your record is signed with post-quantum signatures. Here is what it covers, what we measured, and where it stops.

  • Database and files in Paris
  • Servers in Paris
  • Post-quantum connections
  • Sealed documents, signed record
  1. Your browser

    On Mac or PC

  2. X25519MLKEM768

    TLS 1.3

  3. The platform’s servers

    Paris, France

  4. X25519MLKEM768

    TLS 1.3

  5. The database and files

    Paris, France

Measured on 5 November 2026, offering X25519MLKEM768 alone. A browser that does not offer it gets classical TLS.

4 to 5 November 2026

Moved to Paris
Checked row by row

On the night of 4 to 5 November 2026, the platform moved to Paris. The final copy travelled over post-quantum connections only, and every table was compared with the original before Paris took over, at 00:27 Paris time.

217

Tables comparedRow by row, by fingerprint: identical to the original.

100%

Files identicalEach one checked by its SHA-256 fingerprint after the copy.

1

Key exchange offeredX25519MLKEM768 alone, with no classical fallback.

0

Direct connections allowedThe database’s own port refuses every address on the internet. Everything goes through HTTPS.

One exception, disclosed: during the rehearsal, before the post-quantum test, a first trial copy went over classical encryption. It was deleted, and everything after it travelled post-quantum.

Post-quantum, on the wire

Recorded today
Unreadable tomorrow

Encrypted traffic can be recorded today and kept until a quantum computer can open it. That is why the platform and its database’s gateway negotiate a hybrid key exchange, X25519MLKEM768: ML-KEM-768, standardised by NIST to resist quantum computers, together with the long-established X25519. To read the traffic, an attacker would have to break both.

Post-quantum

From your browser to the platform

The platform and its database’s gateway accept the hybrid exchange, so a browser that offers it gets it, as current versions of Safari, Chrome, Firefox and Edge do. An older browser falls back to classical TLS.

Technical detail
Protocol
TLS 1.3
Key exchange
X25519MLKEM768, hybrid
Post-quantum part
ML-KEM-768, NIST FIPS 203
Measured on
lornevale-platform.com and the database’s gateway, 5 November 2026
Older browsers
Classical TLS with forward secrecy
Post-quantum

From our servers to the database

The platform’s servers in Paris run Node.js 24 with OpenSSL 3.5, which offers the hybrid exchange first. The database’s gateway accepts it.

Technical detail
Runtime
Node.js 24.22.2 with OpenSSL 3.5, named in the requests it sends to the database
Offered first
X25519MLKEM768
Measured
This runtime and the database’s gateway agree on X25519MLKEM768, 4 November 2026
Regions
cdg1 and eu-west-3, both in Paris
Closed

No direct way into the database

The database’s own port cannot negotiate post-quantum TLS, so it is closed to every address on the internet, with TLS required. From outside, your data is reached over HTTPS alone.

Technical detail
Database port
Its allow list holds no address on the internet
TLS
Required
Way in
The data, sign-in and file services, over HTTPS
Checked
5 November 2026
Post-quantum

This page, too

lornevale.com accepts the same exchange. If your browser offers it, you are reading these words over it.

Technical detail
Site
lornevale.com
Key exchange
X25519MLKEM768
Measured
5 November 2026

Sources: NIST FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), August 2024 · NIST FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA), August 2024 · ANSSI on post-quantum cryptography (in French).

At rest

Sealed documents
A signed record

What is stored is protected too. Each document is encrypted with a key of its own, and that key is locked by ML-KEM-1024 and X25519 together. Each checkpoint of your record carries three signatures, two of them post-quantum.

  • Documents

    AES-256-GCM, a new key for each document, locked by X25519 + ML-KEM-1024, the strongest of the three ML-KEM levels in NIST FIPS 203.

  • The record

    Every action chained to the one before it, and checkpoints signed with ML-DSA-87, SLH-DSA and Ed25519.

  • Keys of your own

    The keys that lock your documents are specific to your company.

Quote_Rossi_Plomberie.pdfSealed
Content
AES-256-GCM
Key
256 bits, new for this document
Locked by
X25519 + ML-KEM-1024
Stored in
Paris, France
Record
ML-DSA-87, SLH-DSA, Ed25519
How the platform seals a document when it stores it.

Said plainly

What is in Paris
And what is not

Paris holds your workspace. Some of the services the platform uses work elsewhere, with the providers we name.

In Paris, France

  • The database, with everything your workspace records
  • Your files and documents
  • Sign-in: accounts and two-step verification
  • The servers that run the platform

Elsewhere, with our providers

  • Sending and receiving email
  • Calls, and the assistant’s voice on them
  • Card payments
  • The analysis of de-identified text
  • Until we delete it, by 11 November 2026 at the latest, a frozen copy from before the move, in our host’s former European region

Supabase and Vercel, which host the platform, are companies based in the United States; your workspace is held in their Paris regions. The service providers page lists our providers, their roles and where they work.

Where it stops

What post-quantum
does not cover yet

Here is where our post-quantum protection ends today.

  • Certificates and sign-in

    The certificates that prove each server’s identity, and the tokens that keep you signed in, still use classical cryptography. Post-quantum protects what crosses the wire; who sent it is still checked the classical way.

  • The telephone network

    A call reaches the assistant over the public telephone network, which is not encrypted end to end.

  • Our providers

    Emails, payments and calls also pass through our providers, under their own encryption. Some, such as the card payment provider, do not accept post-quantum connections yet.

  • Inside our hosts

    Each connection ends at our hosts’ edge or at the database’s gateway; beyond that point, the links inside Vercel and Supabase use their own encryption, which we cannot measure. Your records and messages are encrypted on disk by the host, not sealed one by one like documents.

Questions from
your IT team?

We walk your IT team through every measurement on this page before you start.